A New Measure of Financial Openness by Chinn, Menzie David & Ito, Hiro
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Economics Faculty Publications and 
Presentations Economics 
5-2007 
A New Measure of Financial Openness 
Menzie David Chinn 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Hiro Ito 
Portland State University, ito@pdx.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Citation Details 
Menzie D. Chinn & Hiro Ito (2008) A New Measure of Financial Openness, Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis: Research and Practice, 10:3, 309-322, DOI: 10.1080/13876980802231123 
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make 
this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
A New Measure of Financial Openness  
by 
 
Menzie D. Chinn* 





Portland State University 
 
May 23, 2007 
 
Abstract 
We create a new index that measures the extent of openness in capital account transactions. Despite 
the abundance of literature and policy analyses regarding the effect of financial liberalization, the 
debate is far from settled. One of the reasons for that outcome is the lack of proper ways of measuring 
the extent of the openness in cross-border financial transactions. We seek to remedy this deficiency by 
creating an index aimed at measuring the extensity of capital controls based on the information from 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This 
paper details how we construct the data and where our index stands in relation to the extant literature. 
Given the intricacy of capital controls policies and regulations, the exercise of quantifying the extent 
of financial openness remains a challenging task. Nonetheless, our index makes a substantial 
contribution in terms of its coverage of countries and time period; the data are available for 181 
countries for the 1970 – 2005 period.  
 
Acknowledgements:  We thank Ashok Mody, Antu Panini Murshid, and Dennis Quinn for providing 
data, and Jacques Miniane for making his financial openness index publicly available. We also thank 
Pariyate (Sam) Potchamanawong for his excellent research assistance and Joe Stewart for graphical 
assistance. The financial support of faculty research funds of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
Portland State University, and Japan Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. The dataset discussed in this 
paper is publicly available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html or http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/ . 
 
JEL Classification Nos.: F33, G28 
Keywords: Capital account openness; capital controls; economic integration.  
 
* Chinn: Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs; and Department of Economics, University of 
Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706. Email: mchinn@lafollette.wisc.edu  
 
** Corresponding Author – Ito: Department of Economics, Portland State University, 1721 SW Broadway, 
Portland, OR 97201. Tel/Fax: +1-503-725-3930/3945. Email: ito@pdx.edu  
 1
1. Introduction 
The world economy has enjoyed a period of remarkable tranquility since the end of 
the Argentina financial crisis. Nonetheless, the interest in the effect of financial 
globalization has not waned. Debates in policy and academic circles about the effect of 
financial liberalization policies on economic performance and the costs and benefits of 
capital controls policies continue to swirl. One reason for the lack of consensus can be 
ascribed to the difficulty in properly measuring the extent of openness or restrictions in 
cross-border financial transactions.  
There is no question that it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital 
account controls. Although many measures exist to describe the extent and intensity of 
capital account controls, it is generally agreed that such measures fail to capture fully the 
complexity of real-world capital controls for a number of reasons.1  
First, conventional measures of quantifying capital controls (or financial openness) 
fail to account for the intensity of capital controls. The most prominent example of such 
measures include binary variables based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration reported 
in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).2 
Second, IMF-based variables are too aggregated to capture the subtleties of actual capital 
controls. Capital controls can differ depending on the direction of capital flows (i.e., 
inflows or outflows) as well as the type of financial transactions targeted.3 Thirdly, it is 
                                                          
1  See Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), Edison et al. (2002), and Kose et al. (2006) for 
discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions. For extensive reviews on capital 
controls policy or financial liberalization, refer to Dooley (1996), Eichengreen (2002), Kose et al. (2006), and 
Henry (2006). 
2 The exceptions to be noted are Quinn (1997 and 2003) and Miniane (2004) as we will discuss later.  
3 This issue is somewhat alleviated by the recent disaggregation in the AREAER of the capital account 
restriction category. In 1997, AREAER started publishing the data on disaggregated components of capital 
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almost impossible to distinguish between de jure and de facto controls on capital 
transactions. Capital control policies are often implemented without explicit policy goals to 
control the volume and/or type of capital flows. Conversely, as Edwards (1999) discusses, 
it is often the case that the private sector circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying 
the expected effect of regulatory capital controls.4 Therefore, researchers often refer to 
financial integration among countries and interpret it as de facto restrictions on capital 
transactions (See De Gregorio, 1998 and Rajan, 2003).5 
Nonetheless, many researchers have attempted to measure the impact or the 
determinants of capital controls by relying on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Since 1967, AREAER provides 
information on the extent and nature of the rules and regulations governing external 
account transactions for a wide cross-section of countries. It contains a summary table that 
conveniently enumerates the presence of restrictions for the countries. This table has 
provided the basis for researchers to come up with the dichotomous measure of capital 
controls or financial openness. Up to 1997, the AREAER’s summary table categorized the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
controls, with the specification of thirteen categories including, for the first time, a distinction between 
restrictions on inflows and outflows as well as between different types of capital transactions. See Johnston 
and Tamirisa (1998) and Miniane (2004) for a descriptive overview and statistical analysis on the 
disaggregated data of AREAER.  
4 Capital controls might be as stringent and command-and-control oriented as those imposed by the Latin 
American governments in the wake of the 1980's debt crises, or of a less dirigiste form such as the Chilean 
unrenumerated reserve requirements (URR). See Edwards (1998, 1999). 
5 Kose et al. (2006) and Rajan (2003) categorize the measures of capital financial openness de jure measures 
(based on IMF’s AREAER); de facto measures based on price differentials such as the uncovered or real 
interest rate parity (Cheung, et al., 2003) and international arbitrage pricing model (IAPM) or capital asset 
pricing model (ICAPM) (see De Gregorio, 1998); and de facto measures based on quantities, i.e., volumes of 
capital flows as a ratio to GDP, such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). A drawback of the price-based 
measures is that the measures, especially those based on the interest rate parity conditions, can reflect changes 
in macroeconomic conditions even if there is no regulatory changes on capital account transactions. Other 
sources for categorization of measures on financial integration and/or financial openness are Cavoli, et al. 
(2003) and Takagi and Hirose (2004). 
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types of the controls on cross-border financial transactions in four groups; One is about the 
existence of multiple exchange rates; two the presence of restrictions on current account 
transactions; three that of restrictions on capital account transactions, and four that of 
regulatory requirements of the surrender of export proceeds. The third category (on capital 
account restrictions) or its combination with the second category (on current account 
restrictions) has been often used as a dummy variable for the presence of restrictions on 
capital account transactions (see Glick and Hutchison, 2001, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 
1995, among many others). 
As we have discussed, the deficiencies of these dichotomous measures of capital 
controls are obvious; they do not measure the intensity of the controls, nor do they speak to 
their efficacy. A common method used to overcome the deficiencies of the dichotomous 
measures of capital controls entails the construction of variables that depend on the 
proportion of years in the examined window for which countries had liberalized capital 
accounts using the AREAER variables (See Edwards, 2001 and Klein and Olivei, 2001). 
However, as Edison et al. (2002) admit, a drawback of this method is that such indicators 
do not convey any information about whether the country is on its way to liberalizing or 
restricting its capital accounts. In concrete terms, a value of 0.5 can indicate that the capital 
account was closed the first half of the period, and open the second, or vice versa. 
Quinn (1997, 2003) has compiled a composite measure of financial regulation that 
ranges from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most open regime. The 
bulk of the index is based upon his coding of the qualitative information based on the texts 
in the various issues of AREAER pertaining to restrictions on capital account and current 
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account transactions, augmented by information regarding whether the country in question 
has entered into international agreements with international organizations such as the 
OECD and European Union. Despite the merits of the Quinn index, as of the writing of this 
paper, the dataset is not publicly available. 
Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) created the time series of capital controls based on 
the new disaggregated components in the AREAER. However, their data series are not 
sufficiently long; it only covers years after 1996. Most recently, Miniane (2004) 
constructed a set of indices to measure the intensity of capital controls, based on an 
approach akin to Johnston et al., but extrapolating the data back to 1983 for 34 countries.  
Below, we construct an index, which we call KAOPEN, based on the AREAER 
tabulation with the goal of incorporating the extent and intensity of capital controls. Also, 
we aim to cover as many countries and years as those available in the AREAER. While 
containing overtime variation and referring to the intensity of capital controls, our index 
makes the biggest contribution with its coverage of countries and time period among 
indexes for the measures of financial openness; the data are available for 181 countries for 
the 1970 – 2005 period.6 
 
2. Construction of KAOPEN 
KAOPEN is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Up to 1996, we assign 
                                                          
6 We initially constructed this index for Chinn and Ito (2002, 2006). We have updated the series annually 
since then while expanding the scope of countries. 
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dummy variables for the four major categories on the restrictions on external accounts. 
These variables are: 
• variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates (k1); 
• variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions(k2); 
• variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions (k3); and  
• variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4). 
In 1996, the classification method in the AREAER changed and these four categories 
were disaggregated further, in an effort to better reflect the complexity of capital controls 
policies.7 For the extension of the four binary classifications after 1996, we followed Mody 
and Murshid (2005).  
In order to focus on the effect of financial openness – rather than controls – we 
reverse the values of these binary variables, such that the variables are equal to one when 
the capital account restrictions are non-existent. Moreover, for controls on capital 
transitions (k3), we use the share of a five-year window (encompassing year t and the 

















Then we construct an index for capital “openness” (KAOPENt), which is the first 
standardized principal component of k1t, k2t SHAREk3, k4t. This index takes on higher values 
                                                          
7 Especially, the k3 category was divided into 13 categories. See Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) and Miniane 
(2004) for details. 
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the more open the country is to cross-border capital transactions. By construction, the series 
has a mean of zero. The first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be (SHAREk3, k1, k2, 
k4)’ = (0.57, 0.25, 0.52, 0.58)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is not merely 
driven by the SHAREk3 series.  
We incorporate the k1,t, k2,t, and k4,t variables in our KAOPEN variable instead of 
focusing on k3 which refers to restrictions on capital account transactions. We believe the 
incorporation of k1,t, k2,t, and k4,t in this index allows us to more accurately capture the 
intensity of the capital controls. One of the merits of the KAOPEN index is that it attempts 
to measure the intensity of capital controls, insofar as the intensity is correlated with the 
existence of other restrictions on international transactions. By the nature of its 
construction, one may argue that the KAOPEN index measures the extensity of capital 
controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on cross-border 
transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, measuring the 
extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of capital 
controls. This point can be made more concrete by considering a country with an open 
capital account. It may still restrict the flow of capital by limiting transactions on the 
current account restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange rates and 
requirements to surrender export proceeds. Alternatively, countries that already have closed 
capital accounts might try to increase the stringency of those controls by imposing other 
types of restrictions (such as restrictions on current account and requirements for surrender 




3. Some observations of the index 
Our index reflects the widely held perception that the world is moving steadily 
toward greater and greater financial openness. Figure 1 shows development of capital 
account openness measured by the KAOPEN index for the full set of countries, as well as 
different income groups.8 It is clear that industrialized countries have maintained high 
levels of financial openness throughout the period and steadily increased the levels since 
the 1970s. Interestingly, both the less developed and emerging market countries groups 
slowed down the efforts of opening financial markets during the 1980s, and have 
accelerated financial opening since the 1990s.  
In Figure 2, we illustrate development of capital account opening among less 
developed countries for different regions. Inspection of the figure reveals that the pace, -- 
and pattern -- of financial opening exhibits wide regional variation. The Asian region has 
had relatively high levels of financial openness since the 1970s, although the rate of 
financial opening slowed down in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. On the other 
hand, Latin American countries provide an interesting counterpart; their financial openness 
declined drastically during the 1980s – supposedly, this can be interpreted as reaction to the 
debt crisis – and went up rapidly since the beginning of the 1990s. For the last decade, 
ex-planning economies in Eastern and Central Europe have been liberalizing their financial 
markets most rapidly and catching up with other developing countries.  
Lastly, Figure 3 shows the current situation of financial openness in the world. Not 
                                                          
8 The index is normalized with the highest degree of financial openness captured by the value of 100 and the 
lowest by zero. 
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surprisingly, North America and Western Europe appear to be the most financially open 
areas, whereas most of Africa, China, and South Asia appear to be the least. Southeast Asia 
and Latin America lie in between with their moderately open financial markets. 
 
4. Comparison with other indexes  
As Edison et al. (2002) and Kose et al. (2006) compare, many researchers have 
created indexes to measure the extent of financial openness. Our index is compared with 
some of the indexes of financial openness in Table 1. One might think of the Quinn (1997, 
2003) index as the measure of the intensity of capital controls. Although our index may not 
measure the intensity of capital controls in the same way as Quinn approaches, the 
correlation between the Quinn index and KAOPEN, or the Chinn-Ito index, is found to be 
83.9%, suggesting that KAOPEN is proxying the intensity of capital controls.9 The 
correlation between the aforementioned index by Miniane (2004), which is based on more 
disaggregated AREAER information on capital controls, and the Chinn-Ito index is found to 
be 80.2%, while that with the simple average of the 13 post-1996 capital account 
transactions categories is 82%. As far as we are aware, Potchamanawong (2007) constructs 
the only index that distinguishes between controls on capital outflows and inflows on the 
disaggregated basis. The coefficient of correlation between our index and the overall 
composite index of controls on capital inflows is 61%; the coefficient is 71% for capital 
outflows.10 
                                                          
9 It must be noted that, as can be seen in Table 1, the coverage of countries and time periods differ greatly 
across different indexes. 
10 Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) calculate indices for domestic financial system, equity market, and 
capital account liberalization for a select number of developed and emerging market countries. The 
correlation with the overall composite index is 57.6% while that with the component particularly on capital 
 9
By the nature of its construction, this index is a de jure measure of financial 
openness because it attempts to measure regulatory restrictions on capital account 
transactions. Hence, this index differs from price-based de facto measures of financial 
openness, namely those based on the interest rate parity (UIP or RIP) approach such as 
Cheung, et al. (2003) or those on deviations from no arbitrage profits conditions such as De 
Gregorio (1998). These types of financial openness measures have their own strengths and 
weaknesses, so that it is difficult to rank them in terms of usefulness. Our index focuses on 
regulatory aspects of capital account openness.  
 
5. concluding remarks  
Many researchers have tried to capture the complexity of real-world capital controls, 
with varying degrees of success, and varying degrees of coverage.11 Given the complexity 
of capital controls policies and regulations, the measurement of financial openness 
continues to challenge researchers. The key advantage of our index is its relative 
transparency in terms of construction, ease of updating, and wide coverage across countries 
and time.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
account transactions is 67.6%. 
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 Country Numb. 
Country 
Code Country Name Availability 
1 111 USA United States (1970 - 2005) 
2 112 GBR United Kingdom (1970 - 2005) 
3 122 AUT Austria (1970 - 2005) 
4 124 BEL Belgium (1970 - 2005) 
5 128 DNK Denmark (1970 - 2005) 
6 132 FRA France (1970 - 2005) 
7 134 DEU Germany (1970 - 2005) 
8 135 SMR San Marino (1996 - 2004) 
9 136 ITA Italy (1970 - 2005) 
10 138 NLD Netherlands (1970 - 2005) 
11 142 NOR Norway (1970 - 2005) 
12 144 SWE Sweden (1970 - 2005) 
13 146 CHE Switzerland (1996 - 2005) 
14 156 CAN Canada (1970 - 2005) 
15 158 JPN Japan (1970 - 2005) 
16 172 FIN Finland (1970 - 2005) 
17 174 GRC Greece (1970 - 2005) 
18 176 ISL Iceland (1970 - 2005) 
19 178 IRL Ireland (1970 - 2005) 
20 181 MLT Malta (1972 - 2005) 
21 182 PRT Portugal (1970 - 2005) 
22 184 ESP Spain (1970 - 2005) 
23 186 TUR Turkey (1970 - 2005) 
24 193 AUS Australia (1970 - 2005) 
25 196 NZL New Zealand (1970 - 2005) 
26 199 ZAF South Africa (1970 - 2005) 
27 213 ARG Argentina (1970 - 2005) 
28 218 BOL Bolivia (1970 - 2005) 
29 223 BRA Brazil (1970 - 2005) 
30 228 CHL Chile (1970 - 2005) 
31 233 COL Colombia (1970 - 2005) 
32 238 CRI Costa Rica (1970 - 2005) 
33 243 DOM Dominican Republic (1970 - 2005) 
34 248 ECU Ecuador (1970 - 2005) 
35 253 SLV El Salvador (1970 - 2005) 
36 258 GTM Guatemala (1970 - 2005) 
37 263 HTI Haiti (1970 - 2005) 
38 268 HND Honduras (1970 - 2005) 
39 273 MEX Mexico (1970 - 2005) 
40 278 NIC Nicaragua (1970 - 2005) 
41 283 PAN Panama (1970 - 2005) 
42 288 PRY Paraguay (1970 - 2005) 
43 293 PER Peru (1970 - 2005) 
44 298 URY Uruguay (1970 - 2005) 
45 299 VEN Venezuela, RB (1970 - 2005) 
46 311 ATG Antigua and Barbuda (1985 - 2005) 
47 313 BHS Bahamas, The (1977 - 2005) 
48 314 ABW Aruba (1992 - 2005) 
49 316 BRB Barbados (1974 - 2005) 
50 321 DMA Dominica (1982 - 2005) 
51 328 GRD Grenada (1979 - 2005) 
52 336 GUY Guyana (1970 - 2005) 
53 339 BLZ Belize (1985 - 2005) 
54 343 JAM Jamaica (1970 - 2005) 
55 353 ANT Netherlands Antilles (1970 - 2005) 
56 361 KNA St. Kitts and Nevis (1988 - 2005) 
57 362 LCA St. Lucia (1983 - 2005) 
58 364 VCT St. Vincent & the Gren. (1983 - 2005) 
59 366 SUR Suriname (1970 - 2005) 
60 369 TTO Trinidad and Tobago (1970 - 2005) 
61 419 BHR Bahrain (1976 - 2005) 
62 423 CYP Cyprus (1970 - 2005) 
63 429 IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. (1970 - 2005) 
64 433 IRQ Iraq (1970 - 2005) 
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65 436 ISR Israel (1970 - 2005) 
66 439 JOR Jordan (1970 - 2005) 
67 443 KWT Kuwait (1970 - 2005) 
68 446 LBN Lebanon (1970 - 2005) 
69 449 OMN Oman (1977 - 2005) 
70 453 QAT Qatar (1976 - 2005) 
71 456 SAU Saudi Arabia (1970 - 2005) 
72 463 SYR Syrian Arab Republic (1970 - 2005) 
73 466 ARE United Arab Emirates (1976 - 2005) 
74 469 EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. (1970 - 2005) 
75 512 AFG Afghanistan (1970 - 2004) 
76 513 BGD Bangladesh (1976 - 2005) 
77 514 BTN Bhutan (1985 - 2005) 
78 518 MMR Myanmar (1970 - 2005) 
79 522 KHM Cambodia (1973 - 2005) 
80 524 LKA Sri Lanka (1970 - 2005) 
81 532 HKG Hong Kong, China (1970 - 2005) 
82 534 IND India (1970 - 2005) 
83 536 IDN Indonesia (1970 - 2005) 
84 542 KOR Korea, Rep. (1970 - 2005) 
85 544 LAO Lao PDR (1970 - 2005) 
86 548 MYS Malaysia (1970 - 2005) 
87 556 MDV Maldives (1982 - 2005) 
88 558 NPL Nepal (1970 - 2005) 
89 564 PAK Pakistan (1970 - 2005) 
90 566 PHL Philippines (1970 - 2005) 
91 576 SGP Singapore (1970 - 2005) 
92 578 THA Thailand (1970 - 2005) 
93 582 VNM Vietnam (1970 - 2005) 
94 611 DJI Djibouti (1982 - 2005) 
95 612 DZA Algeria (1970 - 2005) 
96 614 AGO Angola (1993 - 2005) 
97 616 BWA Botswana (1972 - 2005) 
98 618 BDI Burundi (1970 - 2005) 
99 622 CMR Cameroon (1970 - 2005) 
100 624 CPV Cape Verde (1982 - 2005) 
101 626 CAF Central African Repub. (1970 - 2005) 
102 628 TCD Chad (1970 - 2005) 
103 632 COM Comoros (1981 - 2005) 
104 634 COG Congo, Rep. (1970 - 2005) 
105 636 ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. (1970 - 2000) 
106 638 BEN Benin (1970 - 2005) 
107 642 GNQ Equatorial Guinea (1973 - 2005) 
108 643 ERI Eritrea (1998 - 2005) 
109 644 ETH Ethiopia (1970 - 2005) 
110 646 GAB Gabon (1970 - 2005) 
111 648 GMB Gambia, The (1971 - 2005) 
112 652 GHA Ghana (1970 - 2005) 
113 654 GNB Guinea - Bissau (1981 - 2005) 
114 656 GIN Guinea (1970 - 2005) 
115 662 CIV Cote d'Ivoire (1970 - 2005) 
116 664 KEN Kenya (1970 - 2005) 
117 666 LSO Lesotho (1972 - 2005) 
118 668 LBR Liberia (1970 - 2005) 
119 672 LBY Libya (1970 - 2005) 
120 674 MDG Madagascar (1970 - 2005) 
121 676 MWI Malawi (1970 - 2005) 
122 678 MLI Mali (1970 - 2005) 
123 682 MRT Mauritania (1970 - 2005) 
124 684 MUS Mauritius (1972 - 2005) 
125 686 MAR Morocco (1970 - 2005) 
126 688 MOZ Mozambique (1988 - 2005) 
127 692 NER Niger (1970 - 2005) 
128 694 NGA Nigeria (1970 - 2005) 
129 698 ZWE Zimbabwe (1984 - 2005) 
130 714 RWA Rwanda (1970 - 2005) 
131 716 STP Sao Tome and Principe (1981 - 2004) 
132 718 SYC Seychelles (1981 - 2005) 
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133 722 SEN Senegal (1970 - 2005) 
134 724 SLE Sierra Leone (1970 - 2005) 
135 726 SOM Somalia (1970 - 2005) 
136 728 NAM Namibia (1994 - 2005) 
137 732 SDN Sudan (1970 - 2005) 
138 734 SWZ Swaziland (1973 - 2005) 
139 738 TZA Tanzania (1970 - 2005) 
140 742 TGO Togo (1970 - 2005) 
141 744 TUN Tunisia (1970 - 2005) 
142 746 UGA Uganda (1970 - 2005) 
143 748 BFA Burkina Faso (1970 - 2005) 
144 754 ZMB Zambia (1970 - 2005) 
145 813 SLB Solomon Islands (1982 - 2005) 
146 819 FJI Fiji (1975 - 2005) 
147 826 KIR Kiribati (1990 - 2005) 
148 846 VUT Vanuatu (1985 - 2000) 
149 853 PNG Papua New Guinea (1979 - 2005) 
150 862 WSM Samoa (1975 - 2005) 
151 866 TON Tonga (1989 - 2005) 
152 867 MHL Marshall Islands (1996 - 2005) 
153 868 FSM Micronesia, Fed. Sts. (1996 - 2005) 
154 911 ARM Armenia (1996 - 2005) 
155 912 AZE Azerbaijan (2000 - 2005) 
156 913 BLR Belarus (1996 - 2005) 
157 914 ALB Albania (1996 - 2005) 
158 915 GEO Georgia (1998 - 2005) 
159 916 KAZ Kazakhstan (1998 - 2005) 
160 917 KGZ Kyrgyz Republic (1998 - 2005) 
161 918 BGR Bulgaria (1996 - 2005) 
162 921 MDA Moldova (1998 - 2005) 
163 922 RUS Russian Federation (1998 - 2005) 
164 923 TJK Tajikistan (1998 - 2005) 
165 924 CHN China (1970 - 2005) 
166 925 TKM Turkmenistan (1998 - 2005) 
167 926 UKR Ukraine (1998 - 2005) 
168 927 UZB Uzbekistan (1998 - 2005) 
169 935 CZE Czech Republic (1998 - 2005) 
170 936 SVK Slovak Republic (1998 - 2005) 
171 939 EST Estonia (1998 - 2005) 
172 941 LVA Latvia (1998 - 2005) 
173 944 HUN Hungary (1998 - 2005) 
174 946 LTU Lithuania (1998 - 2005) 
175 948 MNG Mongolia (1998 - 2005) 
176 960 HRV Croatia (1998 - 2005) 
177 961 SVN Slovenia (1998 - 2005) 
178 962 MKD Macedonia, FYR (1998 - 2005) 
179 963 BIH Bosnia and Herzeg. (1999 - 2005) 
180 964 POL Poland (1990 - 2005) 
181 968 ROM Romania (1976 - 2005) 
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Quinn (1997) 83.9 
1958 – 1997 for  
21 industrialized countries 
1958, 1973, 1982, and 1988 
for 40 less developed 
countries 
Based on AREAER’s codification before the 
1996 revision, augmented by information on 
the existence of international agreements with 
international organizations or other countries 
Miniane (2004) 80.2 1983 – 2004 for 34 countries 
Based on the post-1996 disaggregated 
enumeration of 13 capital account transactions, 
and extrapolated back to 1983 
IMF’s post-1996 AREAER  82.0 1995 – 2005, 181 countries The average of the 13 capital account transaction categories 
k1 (multiple exchange rates) 38.4 1967 – 2005, 181 countries Binary variable for the existence of restrictions 
k2 (current account transactions) 78.8 1967 – 2005, 181 countries Same as above 
k3 (capital account transactions) 83.0 1967 – 2005, 181 countries Same as above 
k4 (export proceeds surrender) 88.0 1967 – 2005, 181 countries Same as above 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) 57.6 1973 – 2000, 28 countries 
Based on the chronology of regulatory restrictions 
on 1) domestic financial markets, 2) capital 
account transactions and 3) equity markets 
Kaminsky and Schmukler’s component 
particularly on capital account 
transactions 
67.6 1996 – 2005,  2) capital account transactions only 
Potchamanawong (2007)  
inflow controls 61.1 
1995 – 2004,  
26 emerging market countries 
Based on the text in the AREAER on the 13 
post-1996 disaggregated categories and divided 
depending on whether the restrictions are place on 
inflows or outflows of capital 
Potchamanawong (2007) 
outflow controls 70.8 
1995 – 2004,  
26 emerging market countries Same as above 
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Figure 1: Development of capital account openness measured by the KAOPEN index 















1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2005
Total Industrial Countries
Less Developed Emerging Markets
 
Note: The index is normalized with the highest degree of financial openness captured by 
the value of 100 and the lowest by the value of zero. 
 
Figure 2: Development of capital account openness measured by the KAOPEN index 
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Less Developed Asia&Pacific
Latin South Asia, Middle East & Africa
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Note: The index is normalized with the highest degree of financial openness captured by 
the value of 100 and the lowest by the value of zero 
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Figure 3: The World Map of financial openness 
 
 
 
